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STATE CONTROL OF WATER VITAL TO
IRRIGATED-LAND STATES
Congress long ago established and has repeatedly reaffirmed as a
fixed national policy that the respective States shall determine the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of water within their borders.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. LAWRENCE LEWIS
OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, December 20, 1937
LETTER SIGNED BY ALL 14 REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE 8 STATES
OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION, TOGETHER WITH A MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED WITH THE LETTER TO THE COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-

TIVES

Mr. LEWIS of Colorado.

Mr. Speaker, under the leave

to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following
letter signed by all 14 Representatives from the 8 States of
the Rocky Mountain region, together with a memorandum
transmitted with the letter to the Commitee on Rivers and
Harbors of the House of Representatives:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D. C., December 13, 1937.
COMMITTEE ON RIVERS AND HARBORS,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
DEAR COLLEAGUES: In our irrigated-land States of the
West the primary essential to our growth and development-
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indeed, to our very existence-is water. Our entire economic
structure and life is based on this indispensable resource. Our
water supply is limited.
Our pioneers found from experience that the commonlaw rules in regard to water were not applicable to our peculiar conditions, and therefore they developed a system of
local rules, customs, and laws adapted to and conforming
with those conditions. These rules, customs, and laws have
been fully elaborated in decisions by our Territorial and later
by our State courts, and have been codified in statutes providing for the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of
water in our respective States.
Beginning from a long time before any of us were born
and continuing down to the present, the Congress of the
United States has recognized and approved by repeated statutes such local rules, customs, laws, and decisions of courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly upheld these Federal statutes. All of the executive departments
up to the present have unquestioningly conformed their activities to the mandate of the Congress.
In the attached memorandum we have referred to some
of the more important acts of the Congress and decisions of
the United States Supreme Court.
We emphatically assert that any legislation which would
tend to interfere with the supremacy of our State laws in
respect to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
waters within the borders of our respective States would not
only be a complete reversal of the policy of the Federal Government but also would constitute a major disaster to the
economic and social structure of the irrigated land States.
Some provisions in the bills now before your committee
threaten, if they do not actually destroy, this control by the
respective States of the waters within their borders.
Memorandums presented by Congressman EDWARD T.
TAYLOR, of Colorado, by Governor Leslie E. Miller, of
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Wyoming, and by various organizations in the irrigated land
States have pointed out in detail the particular portions of
these bills which constitute such threat to the State control
of our waters and reversal of the heretofore uniform policy
of the Federal Government.
We hasten to add that we understand it is the intention
of your committee to reframe these bills in order to avoid
any such unfortunate and revolutionary change in our
national policy. In making such changes we believe the attached memorandum may be helpful to you. You may rely
on the fullest cooperation of each and all of us in reframing
the bills now before your committee.
In any event there should be embodied in the bill or bills
as rewritten a section in language similar to the following,
to-wit:
"Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or
intended to affect or 'in any way to interfere with the laws
of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal use or for any other uses whatsoever, or any vested
right acquired therein; and nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way to interfere with such rights as the respective States now have to
adopt hereafter such policies and to enact such laws as they
may deem necessary with respect to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of waters within their borders, except as modified by compacts between the States, or other interstate agreements. All officers and agencies of the Federal
Government in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall
proceed in conformity with such State laws now or hereafter
enacted and nothing herein shall in any way affect any right
of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any
interstate stream, or the waters thereof."
We call attention to the fact that the language above
suggested is strictly in accordance with and largely a copy of
sections contained in the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902;
in the Federal Water Power Act of June 10, 1920; and in the
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Boulder Canyon Project Act of December 21, 1928.
The
sections in these acts are quoted in the attached memorandum.
Sincerely yours,
John R. Murdock, of Arizona, Edward T. Taylor,
Fourth District, Colorado; Lawrence Lewis, First
District, Colorado; Fred Cummings, Second District, Colorado; John A. Martin, Third District,
Colorado; D. Worth Clark, Second District, Idaho;
Compton I. White, First District, Idaho; James F.
O'Connor, Second District, Montana; Jerry J.
O'Connell, First District, Montana; J. G. Scrugham, Nevada; John J. Dempsey, New Mexico; Abe
Murdock, First District, Utah; J. W. Robinson,
Second District, Utah; Paul R. Greever, Wyoming.
MEMORANDUM

(The Congress and the Supreme Court of the United States
have repeatedly recognized and approved the validity
of local rules, customs, laws, and court decisions in respect to appropriation, control, use, and distribution of
water)
Seventy-five or eighty years ago when agriculture was
first undertaken by American settlers in regions now included
in those Western States where irrigation is practiced, it was
realized that the common-law "doctrine of riparian rights"
in regard to the waters of natural streams was not applicable
to conditions in those regions. Consequently the commonlaw "doctrine of riparian rights," or "riparian doctrine,"
that a riparian landowner is entitled to have waters of a
natural stream continue to flow as they had flowed from
time immemorial, subject to the reasonable uses of other riparian landowners, was rejected, and there was formulated
and adopted the "doctrine of prior appropriation," or "appropriation doctrine," under which he who first diverts the
water of a natural stream and applies such water to beneflical
use, regardless of the locus of such application to the beneficial
use, acquires a prior right or "priority" to the extent of such
use against all subsequent appropriators up and down the
stream.
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As was stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Clark v. Nash (1905) (198 U. S. 361, 370), in language
subsequently emphatically approved by the United States
Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver
PortlandCement Co. (1935) (295 U. S. 142, 165):
"The rights of a riparian owner in and to the use of the
water flowing by his land are not the same in the arid and
mountainous States of the West that they are in the States
of the East. These rights have been altered by many of the
Western States, by their constitutions and laws, because of
the totally different circumstances in which their inhabitants
are placed, from those that exist in the States of the East, and
such alterations have been made for the very purpose of thereby contributing to the growth and prosperity of those States
arising from mining and the cultivation of an otherwise
valueless soil, by means of irrigation. This Court must
recognize the difference of climate and soil, which render
necessary these different laws in the States so situated."
Very early in the period of initial settlement of the
region now comprised within the so-called irrigated-land
States of the far West, the Congress recognized and approved,
as respects the public domain, "so far as the United States are
concerned, the validity of the local customs, law, and decisions
of courts" in respect to appropriation of water and to its
control, use and distribution. This recognition and approval has been repeatedly reaffirmed by subsequent acts of the
Congress and by opinions of the United States Supreme
Court:
ACTS OF THE CONGRESS

Act of Congress of July 26, 1866 (14 Stat. L. 253,
ch. 262, sec. 9; as amended by act of July 9, 1870, 16 Stat.
L. 218, ch. 235, sec. 17; U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 43, sec.
661);
Desert Land Act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. L. 377,
ch. 107, sec. 1; U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 43, sec. 321);
Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. L. 390,
ch. 1093, sec. 8; U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 43, sec. 383) ;
Federal Water Power Act of June 10, 1920 (41 Stat.
L. 1077, ch. 285, sec. 27; U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 16,
ch. 12, sec. 821);
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Boulder Canyon Project Act of December 21, 1928 (45
Stat. L. 1065, ch. 42, sec. 18; U. S. C., 1934 edition, ch. 43,
sec. 617q).
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land Co. (1902), 188 U. S.
545, 552-553;
Kansas v. Colorado (1906), 206 U. S. 46, 94;
Clark v. Nash (1905), 198 U. S. 361, 370;
Wyoming v. Colorado (1921), 259 U. S. 419, 465;
Nebraska v. Wyoming (1935), 295 U. S. 40, 43;
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. (1935), 295 U. S. 142, 154-165.
By way of example:
The Reclamation Act (act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat.
L. 390, ch. 1093, sec. 8; U. S. C., 1934 edition, title 43,
sec. 383) expressly provides:
"SEC. 383. Vested rights and State laws unaffected by
chapter: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the
laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or
any vested right acquired thereunder; and the Secretary of the
Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, shall
proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein
shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user
of water in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters
thereof."
The Federal Water Power Act (act of June 10, 1920;
41 Stat. L. 1077, ch. 285, sec. 27; U. S. C., 1934 ed., title
16, ch. 12, sec. 821) provides:
"SEC. 821. State laws and water rights unaffected:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the
laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or
for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired
therein."
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The Colorado River compact, the negotiation of which
was authorized by act of Congress approved August 19,
1921 (42 Stat. L. 171, ch. 72) and which was signed at
Santa Fe, N. Mex., November 24, 1922, provides, in article
IV, paragraph (c), as follows:
The provisions of this article shall not apply to
"(c)
or interfere with the regulation and control by any State
within its boundaries of the appropriation, use, and distribution of water."
This compact was expressly approved by the Congress
in the so-called Boulder Canyon Project Act (act of December 21, 1928; 45 Stat. L. 1064, ch. 42, sec. 13; U. S. C.,
1934 ed., title 43, sec. 617 (1).
This action by the Congress was an approval of each
and every provision in the Colorado River Compact, including the provisions of article IV, paragraph (c) hereinabove
quoted. But the Congress in this same Boulder Canyon
Project Act went further and strongly reemphasized in an
additional section the principle that the Federal Government
would not interfere with the regulation and control by any
State within its boundaries of the appropriation, use, and
distribution of water.
Section 18 of said Boulder Canyon Project Act (45
Stat. L. 1065, ch. 42, sec. 18; U. S. C., 1934 ed., ch. 43, sec.
617q) is as follows:
"SEC. 617q. Effect of chapter on authority of States
to control waters .within own borders: Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as interfering with such rights as the
States now have either to the waters within their borders or
to adopt such policies and enact such laws as they may deem
necessary with respect to the appropriation, control, and use
of waters within their borders, except as modified by the
Colorado River Compact or other interstate agreement."
In Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land Co. (1902) (188
U. S. 545), Mr. Justice White said in delivering the opinion
of the Court (pp. 552-553):
"* ** We think, in view of the legislation of Congress
on the subject of the appropriation of water on the public
domain, particularly referred to in the opinion of this Court

DICTA

in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co. (174 U. S.
690, 704-706), the objection is devoid of merit. As stated
in the opinion just referred to, by the act of July 26, 1866
(ch. 262, sec. 9, 14 Stat. 253; Rev. Stat., sec. 2339), Congress recognized, as respects the public domain, 'so far as
the United States are concerned, the validity of the local customs, law, and decisions of courts in respect to the appropriation of water.'
In Kansas v. Colorado (1906) (206 U. S. 46) Mr.
Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said
(p. 94):
"It [each State] may determine for itself whether the
common-law rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the
appropriation of waters for the purposes of irrigation shall
control. Congress cannot enforce either rule upon any
State."
In Wyoming v. Colorado (1921) (259 q. S. 419) the
Court says, at page 465:
"But here the controversy is between States in both of
which the doctrine of appropriation has prevailed from the
time of the first settlements, always has been applied in the
same way, and has been recognized and sanctioned by the
United States the owner of the public lands. * * * Nor is the
United States seeking to impose a policy of its choosing on
either State. All that it has done has been to recognize and
give its sanction to the policy which each has adopted."
In the recent case of Nebraska v. Wyoming (1935)
(295 U. S. 40, at p. 43) the Supreme Court held:
"2.
The motion asserts that the Secretary of the Interior is an indispensable party. The bill alleges, and we
know as a matter of law, that the Secretary and his agents,
acting by authority of the Reclamation Act and supplementary legislation, must obtain permits and priorities for the use
of water from the State of Wyoming in the same manner as
a private appropriator or an irrigation district formed under
the State law. His rights can rise no higher than those of
Wyoming, and an adjudication of the defendant's rights will
necessarily bind him. Wyoming will stand in judgment
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for him as for any other appropriator in that State. He is
not a necessary party."
In the recent case of California Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co. (1935) (295 U. S. 142 supra)
the United States Supreme Court held, among other things,
as summarized in headnote 8 of the official edition:
"8.
Following the Desert Land Act of 1877, if not
before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public
domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control
of the designated States, including those since created out of
the Territories named, with the right in each to determine for
itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain"
(p. 163).
In this case the United States Supreme Court elaborately
outlines the history of the development of the law in relation
to waters in the irrigated-land States of the West, refers to
and discusses the several acts of the Congress and the uniform
line of decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
An important footnote appended to this case in the
official reports (p. 164 of 295 U. S.) is as follows:
"In this connection it is not without significance that
Congress, since the passage of the Desert Land Act, has repeatedly recognized the supremacy of State law in respect of
the acquisition of water for the reclamation of public lands
of the United States and lands of its Indian wards. Two
examples may be cited:
"The Reclamation Act of 1902 (c. 1093, 32 Stat.
388), directed the Secretary of the Interior (section 8) to
proceed in conformity to the State laws in carrying out the
provisions of the act, and provided that nothing in the act
should be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in
any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory
'relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution
of water used in irrigation.'
"The act of June 21, 1906 (c. 3504, 34 Stat. 325,
375), made an appropriation for constructing irrigation systems to irrigate lands of the Uncompahgre, Uintah, and
White River Utes in Utah, with the proviso that 'such irriga-
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tion systems shall be constructed and completed and held and
operated, and water therefor appropriated under the laws of
the State of Utah,' etc. This was amended 1- the Indian
Appropriation Act of March 3, 1909, c. 263, 35 Stat. 781,
812, which again recognized the supremacy of the laws of
Utah in respect of appropriation, and provided that the appropriation should 'be used only in the event of failure to
procure from the State of Utah or its officers an extension of
time in which to make final proof for waters appropriated for
the benefit of the Indians.' "
It thus appears that by repeated acts of the Congress a
definite national policy from which there has never been the
slightest deviation, was long since determined upon, to-wit,
that the Federal Government shall proceed in conformity
with "the local customs, law and decisions of courts" of the
respective States in relation to the control, appropriation, use
and distribution of water within their borders.
Furthermore, in the respective State constitutions of the
several irrigated-land States, which constitutions were submitted to and approved by the Federal Government prior to
the admission of these States to the Union, the same principle
of control by each State of the waters within its borders was
strongly emphasized.
For example: Before Colorado was admitted to the
Union on August 1, 1876, its constitution was approved by
the Federal Government. Sections 5 and 6 of article XVI
of the Colorado Constitution, then were and still are as follows:
"SEC. 5. Water, public property: The water of
every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the
State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of
the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people
of the State, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
"SEc. 6. Diverting unappropriated water; priority:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of
appropriation shall give the better right as between those
using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters
of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all
those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for
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domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the
same for manufacturing purposes.
Before Wyoming was admitted to the Union, July 10,
1890, its constitution was submitted to and approved by the
Federal Government. Section 3 1 of article I, being a part
of the "Declaration of Rights" in this constitution, was and
still is as follows:
"SEC. 3 1. Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural
channels, its control must be in the State, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests
involved."
Article VIII was and still is as follows:
"Irrigation and water rights.
"SECTION 1.
Water is State property: The water of
all natural streams, springs, lakes, or other collections of still
water, within the boundaries of the State, are hereby declared
to be the property of the State.
"SEC. 2. Board of control: There shall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the State engineer
and superintendents of the water division, which shall, under
such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the State and of their appropriation,
distribution, and diversion, and of the various officers connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by
the courts of the State.
"SEC. 3. Priority of appropriation: Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right. No
appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interests.
"SEC. 4. Water divisions: The legislature shall by
law divide the State into four water divisions, and provide
for the appointment of superintendents thereof.
"SEC. 5. State engineer: There shall be a State engineer who shall be appointed by the Governor of the State and
confirmed by the senate; he shall hold his office for the term
of six (6) years, or until his successor shall have been ap-
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pointed and shall have qualified. He shall be president of
the board of control, and shall have general supervision of
the waters of the State and of the officers connected with its
distribution. No person shall be appointed to this position
who has not such theoretical knowledge and such practical
experience and skill as shall fit him for the position."
Similar provisions were embodied in the constitutions of
other irrigated-land States, which constitutions were submitted prior to their admission to the Union and were approved
by the Federal Government. Such provisions still remain
in these constitutions. For example:
Section 15 of article III, Constitution of Montana, admitted to the Union November 8, 1889.
Article XV of the Constitution of Idaho, which State
was admitted to the Union by act of Congress July 3, 1890.
Article XVII, Constitution of Utah, which State was
admitted to the Union January 4, 1896.
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of article XVI, Constitution of New
Mexico, which State was admitted to the Union January 6,
1912.
Sections 1 and 2 of article XVII, Constitution of Arizona, which State was admitted to the Union February 14,
1912.
From the foregoing it is manifest that one of the conditions upon which the people of the irrigated-land States assumed the responsibilities of Statehood, was that the respective
States should have the right of control, appropriation, use,
and distribution of waters within their borders, in conformity with their local customs, laws, and decisions of their
courts. This was part of the solemn covenant entered into
between the Federal Government and the people of the respective irrigated-land States. Any departure therefrom would
constitute a breach by the Federal Government of such
solemn covenant.
It is vital to the welfare of the irrigated-land States that
care should be taken, in revising the so-called regionalauthority bills, to make sure that there shall be no departure
therein from the national policy, long since established and
in reliance upon which the West has been settled and de-
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veloped, viz.: That the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of the waters within those States shall be subject
to their local customs, laws, and the decisions of their courts.
EDITOR'S NOTE:
The following article will appear in the April
issue of DICTA: Regionalization of Natural Resources-Extension
of Remarks of Hon. Edward T. Taylor of Colorado in the House of
Representatives, Tuesday, December 21, 1937-Analysis of and comments on the Mansfield Bill (H. R. 7365).

NOW IS THE TIME.
When, if and as, Dictaphun is reestablished, we believe
the following quotation from the case of Bunce vs. Grand 1&
Sixth Bldg., 238 N. W. 867, might be of interest to the
profession:
"A person entering a well-lighted public toilet is quite likely to
be so engrossed in the object of his entry as not to be anticipating or
looking for impediments that may cause him to stumble, and that
women will enter public toilets for women accompanied by small children engrossed in speedily attending to pressing physical needs of their
charges is not beyond the realm of reasonable anticipation."

Apparently the Court recognizes that if "you gotter
KENNETH M. WORMWOOD.
go, you gotter go."
The Department of Taxation received a typed income tax return from a bachelor who listed one dependent son. The examiner
returned the blank with a pencilled notation: "This must be a stenographic error."
Presently the blank came back with the added pencil notation:
"It was not a stenographic error-absolutely not."---Cleveland Bar
Journal, February.
DICTA with the cooperation of Current Legal Thought, "the
lawyers' digest of law reviews," will send you free of charge and without obligation the current issue of this unique publication.
You need only make your request, on your letterhead, to Current Legal Thought, 245 Broadway, New York, N. Y., and the number will be forewarded to you by return mail.
Since the supply of copies available for this purpose is limited, we
urge our readers to take advantage of this opportunity as soon as
possible.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIN-AccIDENT-Halenbeck,

et al. v. But-

ler-No. 14244-Decided December 13, 1937-DistrictCourt of
Denver, Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Employee engaged in work which caused dirt, dust and
grit to fly into his eyes, over a period of seven years. On one occasion,
however, infection set in and he makes claim for medical services for the
treatment of the disease. The doctor testified that it was "of the nature
of an occupational disease." The claimant did not fix any definite date
of injury but stated that on three or four occasions, just prior to the time
the infection set in, he got an excessive amount of dirt and grease in his
eyes. The commission found that there was no accident and that the
infection was only brought about by an occupational disease. The District Court ordered the commission to vacate its award and to carry out
judgment in favor of claimant.
HELD: 1. The fact that dust and other foreign substances were
constantly present and were characteristic of the particular occupation
does not of itself make the condition an occupational disease. The substance which entered claimant's eyes at the time fixed did carry infectious
matter resulting in injury.
2. When a physical condition arises which was induced by an
unusual or excessive exposure at a time reasonably definite, such condition was unexpected and occasioned by an accident.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
SUNDAY BLUE LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-MUNICIPAL

ORDI-

NANCES-POLICE POWER-Allen v. City of Colorado SpringsNo. 14193-Decided December 13, 1937-County Court of El
Paso County, Hon. James F. Sanford, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error convicted of violating ordinance requiring stores for the sale of merchandise to be closed on Sunday, except
when required by necessity. Certain businesses such as retail drug stores
were exempted from the provisions of the ordinance. Plaintiff in error
owned and operated a grocery store and sold certain staple groceries which
were not required by necessity. The drug stores in the city sold soaps,
flavoring extracts, teas, coffees, spices and other similar articles usually
carried by retail groceries.
HELD: 1. The ordinance is unconstitutional in that it is in violation of Sec. 25, Article V, of the Colorado Constitution inhibiting
special and discriminatory legislation.
2. "Unquestionably it is the law that a City, in the exercise of
the police power, has the authority by general ordinance to prohibit the
carrying on within its limits of all businesses or occupations on Sunday,
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except those of necessity or charity, upon the ground that thereby the
peace, good order, good government and welfare of its inhabitants will
be promoted and protected."
3.
If in the operation of the ordinance, it is "discriminatory or
amounts to class or special legislation, irrespective of the purpose for
which it is passed, it is the duty of a court to relieve from its illegal
effect."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bakke dissent.
ALIMONY-DISCRETION OF COURT-POWER OF COURT TO CORRECT
- Weydeveld vs. WeydeveldCLERICAL ERRORS -EVIDENCE
No. 14003-Decided April 4, 1937--DistrictCourt of DenverHon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error is hereinafter referred to as plaintiff and
They were divorced in 1930 and
defendant in error as defendant.
The amount thereof eventually
defendant ordered to pay alimony.
became a matter of dispute and finally of misunderstanding. Citation
was issued against defendant for failure to pay. The original order was
for $30.00 per month. Defendant moved to modify. As disclosed by
the court reporter's notes, the order was granted June 8, 1932, and the
amount thereby reduced to $20.00, but that order was not entered by
the clerk. At the time it was made, defendant was in arrears. Plaintiff
here contends that the court was powerless to grant defendant's application for a reduction while he was in arrears, and powerless to supply the
missing order from the reporter's notes, hence, defendant was in contempt for failure to pay.
HELD: 1. The best reason for reduction of alimony is inability
to pay, but payment is prima facie proof of ability. Modification is
discretionary and discretion depends upon the facts.
The court has inherent power to correct palpable errors in its
2.
record.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
TAX SALES-REPAYMENT OF TAXES UNDER A VOID TAX DEEDDESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY-REAL PROPERTY-The Cripple Creek Trading and Mining Co. us. Stewart-No. 13913 -Decided April 5, 1937-District Court of Teller County-Hon.
John M. Meikle, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Parties are hereinafter referred to as the company and
Stewart, alleging possession and ownership by
Stewart respectively.
virtue of tax deeds, brought action against the company, as holder of the
fee, to quiet title to mining claims. On trial, Stewart admitted his deeds
were void on their face, made proof of possession and the payment of
The court found no
taxes, and presented evidence of improvements.
improvements, ordered that Stewart be reimbursed for his taxes. The
company prosecutes this writ to review the judgment. Its assignments
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amount simply to an assertion of error in requiring it to repay to Stewart

said taxes.
HELD:

1.

Sec. 7429, page 1902, C. L. 1921, provides that in

all cases of recovery of land sold for taxes, all taxes paid shall be reimbursed. It evidently contemplates that he shall pay because the property and its tax burden were his and that burden has been discharged by
another.
2. He who pays a tax and gets a deed can recover only when the
record discloses upon what property the tax was paid and it appears
that reimbursement will discharge the tax.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous concurs.
EVIDENCE -

INSTRUCTIONS -

ORDINANCES -

VEHICLES -

South

Canon vs. Faires-No. 14111--Decided April 5, 1937-County
Court of Fremont County-Hon. Kent L. Eldred, JudgeReversed.
HELD: In an action for a violation of an ordinance which reads:
"No vehicle shall pass, or attempt to pass, any other vehicle proceeding
in the same direction, at any street intersection of said town," the failure
to make signs at the intersection, nor due care, nor lack of it in attempting to pass at the intersection, have any place in evidence or instructions.
The simple question is, did the accused one attempt to pass?
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
CONTRACTS-ROYALTIES -EVIDENCE

-

CONSTRUCTION -

PATENTS

-- Six Star Lubricants Co. v. Morehouse-No. 14146-Decided
December 6, 1937-District Court of Denver, Hon. Charles C.
Sackmann, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, owner of patents on lubricants and greases,
entered into contract with defendant to give latter exclusive right, for a
consideration, to manufacture and sell lubricants using the elements of
the patents during the life of the patents. Later, a new contract was
drawn reducing the royalty payment. In the later contract, drawn by
defendant's counsel, nothing was said as to the length of time over which
the royalty payments were to continue. Plaintiff sued for royalties.
Defendant contended that the plaintiff failed to establish that it used the
formulae of the patents, that defendant's obligation to pay royalty terminated at the expiration dates of the patent, and that plaintiff should not
be entitled to recover after patent expiration date on the theory that the
clause in the contract giving defendant exclusive right to make the lubricants under the formulae was impossible of performance. In the trial
court a jury held for plaintiff.
HELD: 1. The defendant's obligation to pay royalties continued
only so long as it manufactured, jobbed or sold lubricating compounds
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made according to the formulae or any patented modifications or improvements thereof.
2. Record examined and found not to contain any evidence, as to
one period of time, that defendant manufactured any compounds, sold
by it, in accordance with the patents, and, therefore, judgment is reversed
and cause remanded for a new trial.
3. Where defendant sends statement to plaintiff marked "royalty
account" and showing that for certain months it manufactured and sold
a definite amount of the lubricating compounds, and later attempted to
modify it by sending plaintiff a letter stating that the figures in the statement were wrong, and that defendant contended its attorneys had advised it that it was no longer liable for royalties, after expiration of
patents, the jury was justified in finding that the contract did not terminate upon the expiration of the patents and that the mistake did not
relieve defendant from the evidentiary effect that it was liable at least up
to the expiration date.
4. "There is no legal inhibition against a party contracting to
pay royalty on a patented article or formula for a period beyond the date
of the expiration of the patents."
5. In case of ambiguity, uncertainty or indefiniteness, a contract
must be interpreted against the party who drew it.
6. Where parties, when entering into a contract, know the expiration date of patents, involved in the contract, and one agrees to pay royalties thereunder for a period of time extending beyond the expiration
date of the patent, he may not later be permitted to complain of the
anticipated condition brought about by operation of law which permits
all persons to use the formulae after the expiration dates of the patents.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Bouck, and Mr. Justice Young concur.
BONDS-CONTRACTS-COUNTY REFUNDING BONDS-PLEADINGSAMENDMENTS - PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT-AGENCY OF

DEPOSITORY-Employers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pithin County
Commissioners-No. 14096-Decided December 6, 1937-District Court of Pitkin County, Hon. John T. Shumate, JudgeReversed.
FACTS: Action to recover on refunding bonds issued by the
county. Each bond is contract in itself and contains the county's absolute promise to pay, and contains a provision that it is payable at the
office of the County Treasurer or at the banking house of Kountze Bros.
in New York City at the option of the holder upon presentation of the
particular bond or coupon. A tax had beery levied and collected for the
purpose of raising the sum necessary to pay all the bonds maturing on
October 1, 1931, and sufficient funds were deposited with Kountze Bros.
On October 13, 1931, the banking house went into receivership. Originally the plaintiff's pleadings contained allegations to the effect that a
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demand for payment was made upon, and refused by, the County Treasurer as well as that the bonds and coupons had been previously presented for payment at the Kountze Bros. Bank and payment refused.
The trial court found for the defendants; the plaintiff appeals and the
defendants assign cross-error on the ground that the trial court erred in
permitting plaintiff's pleadings to be amended so as to conform to plaintiff's proof, which showed no demand upon Kountze Bros.
HELD: 1. It is elementary that a trial court has the right and
duty to exercise its sound discretion in permitting or refusing the amendment of pleadings to correspond with the evidence adduced, but where
there was clear, convincing and conclusive evidence leading to the inevitable inference that counsel for plaintiff originally labored under a wrong
conception of facts, it was proper for the court to allow the amendments
by the plaintiff substituting the truth for previous error. It would
have been an abuse of discretion not to do so.
2. It is not necessary for the holder of a negotiable instrument to
present the instrument for payment on the day of maturity. Such failure
will not discharge the acceptor of a bill or a maker of a note; and this is
true, even where the paper is made payable at a particular bank, or some
other specified place, and the acceptor or maker can show that be had
deposited sufficient funds to meet his obligation at the stipulated place of
payment.
3. Where the money for payment is deposited and the depository
fails, after maturity of the obligation the loss falls upon the acceptor or
maker and not the holder; but where a place of payment is specified in
the instrument, and the acceptor or maker can prove that he was at the
place, on the day of maturity, ready to pay the amount, or had so deposited sufficient funds to pay the obligation in full, the failure of the holder
to present for payment will prevent any subsequent recovery of damages
and costs, and subsequently accruing interest.
4. The depository where the obligation is made payable is the
agent of the maker, and not of the holder, when there is no evidence of
an express authority otherwise.
5. Evidence considered and found to obtain no substantial evidence of estoppel. In the light of the accepted view that no presentation
at all is necessary to fix the makers' primary liability, the question of the
holder's failure to present the securities within a reasonable length of
time is irrelevant and immaterial.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard dissent.
ESTATES-CLAIMS-EVIDENCE -WITNESSES -STALE
CLAIMS-In
re: Estate of Stepp v. Stepp-No. 14144-Decided December 20,
1937-District Court of Denver, Hon. Charles C. Sac kmann,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff, only unmarried child of family, sued estate of
his mother on claim for services as "nurse, attendant, and housekeeper,"
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for period of sixteen years. The County Court gave him judgment for
full amount, but the District Court reduced it and held that he was not
entitled to any compensation for services as "nurse or housekeeper." The
executor of the estate appealed. By her will, the mother provided that
her estate was to be divided, "share and share alike" among her living
children. The claimant relied on testimony of conversations of his
mother with others in the presence of one of his brothers and certain
persons who purchased the decedent's farm.
HELD: 1. The brother is such an adverse party as is contemplated by Sec. 2, Chap. 177, Vol. 4, 1935 C. S. A. (C. L. 1921, Sec.
6556) and is competent within the meaning of the exceptions contained
in paragraph "Sixth" of said section, to testify, for if the judgment is
sustained, he takes less as an heir.
2. Where there is nothing to show that the witness has an interest
hostile to the estate, and where, on the contrary, the evidence shows that
he would take less if the claim were sustained, he may testify.
3. Neighbors who have no interest in the result of the litigation
may testify as to the conversations.
4. Where both courts believe the witnesses and the story told is
consonant with domestic situations where one child in a large family
remains unmarried and takes care of his aging parents, the Supreme Court
will not disturb the findings.
5. The claim is not "stale," for it did not mature until the death
of the mother.
6. The trial court's decision, on competent testimony, that the
services performed were not gratuities, will not be disturbed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

CORPORATIONS

LACHES -

-

STOCK

-

DIVIDENDS -

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS -

TRANSFER AGENTS

TRUSTS -

Holly Sugar

Corp. v. Wilson-No. 14165-Decided December 6, 1937District Court of El Paso County, Hon. Arthur Cornforth, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by A. E. Wilson of Canon City to recover from
the corporation the value of shares of its preferred stock owned by him
and accumulation of dividends thereon. He recovered.
In 1916 he purchased 20 shares of stock and received certificates
in that number of shares previously issued to another, duly assigned.
Later, in the same year, the corporation issued and delivered to him four
new certificates each for five shares. In 1934 he sold the stock, made
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formal assignments of the certificates, which were at once tendered to the
corporation for re-issuance to the purchaser, but the company denied his
ownership, and retained and ."cancelled" the certificates. Although the
corporation had declared dividends, it neither paid nor advised him of
them, and he knew nothing about them.
The corporation made remittance of dividends to one A. E. Wilson
of Denver, who concedes that he does not own the stock or is entitled
to the dividends. He did present to the corporation his affidavit that he
was the owner of the stock and had lost his certificates, whereupon he
received new certificates. Neither man knew of the other until 1934.
HELD: 1. The original owner's loss was not occasioned by any
negligence on his part and he was within his right in purchasing the
stock through his bank in Canon City and placing the certificates in his
safety deposit box. The carelessness was that of the corporation's transfer agent.
2. The owner and holder of certificates of stock is not put on
inquiry as to dividends or any question concerning the ownership of the
stock.
3.
Under the circumstances, the element of time does not operate
adversely to the plaintiff.
4. The statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches did not
begin to run against the plaintiff until the company repudiated the relation, claimed the stock adversely, and brought such facts to the knowledge of plaintiff.
5. A corporation is trustee for its stockholders, and is bound to
protect their interests, and the stockholder has a right to rely upon the
fact that the corporation will preserve his right to the stock, and to
presume that it will not assert an adverse claim to it.
6. A corporation proceeding to transfer stock, in the absence of
the original certificates, does so at its peril.
7. The statute of limitations does not run against any of the
dividends, since the certificates made no provision as to time when there
is to be a declaration and payment of dividends, and the owner of the
certificates was not advised of the dividends until 1934.
8. A stockholder is under no obligation to draw on demand his
dividends within any prescribed period. The debt which a declared
dividend creates on the part of a corporation to the stockholder is one
,payable only on demand as is the obligation of a bank to its depositors.
It is not subject to limitation until there has been a demand upon the
corporation and a refusal to pay.
9. Neither law nor equity favors the corporation.
10. The plaintiff is not to be relegated to an action against the
Denver Wilson; it was the corporation which converted the stock.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

DICTA
NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL

INJURY-TRESPASSER-LICENSEE-IN-

VITEE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW-

Hooker vs. Routt Realty Co.-No. 14120-Decided January 24,
1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Charles C. Sackmann,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Where one is a trespasser or mere licensee, she may
not recover from owner of property on which she was injured by
falling down a cement stairway on the outside of and at the rear of the
building because she must take the premises as she finds them.
To
trespassers, a landowner owes only the duty of not injuring them by
any affirmative act after becoming aware of their presence.
2. One who enters a hotel from the street going through the
main lobby, through the hall and to the room of guest who she intends to visit is an express invitee.
3. Merely because one happens to be in a court where a portion
of the public was free to go as tenants of the defendant, or customers
of those tenants, does not, in itself, indicate any invitation to her in
the capacity of a visitor to a sick guest of the hotel. There is no
mutuality of interest.
4. Where one departs from the path used by those having occasion to go into the court, she became at best a licensee, and was not
even an implied invitee.
5. Where the facts are not in dispute, and plaintiff's contributory
negligence is evident and unquestionable, the court may declare the
fact established as a matter of law and not permit the matter to go to
the jury. EN BANG.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Knous and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-TIME

TO FILE

CLAIM-WAIVER-

Garden Farm Dairy et at. vs. Dorchak et al.-No. 14124-Decided January 24, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Joseph J. Walsh, Judge-Reversed on Rehearing.
FACTS:
Claimant sustained a compensable injury September 3rd,
1932, but did not file his claim for compensation until March 13th,
1933. He notified employer about middle of February, 1933, that he
claimed compensation, the employed filed a report of the accident with
the commission, February 17, 1933, and two days later the insurance
carrier filed a denial of liability. At the first hearing, the defendant
moved to dismiss the claim upon the grounds that it was not filed within six months of the injury, as provided by the statute. The claimant
contends that defendants waived the statute because they had knowledge of his intent to file the claim, that before the expiration of the
six months' period they filed a denial of liability, setting forth the
grounds upon which they would contest the claim on the merits, that

DICTA
they never filed a supplemental notice of contest setting forth the
ground that the claim was not filed in time; and that during the six
months' period the insurance carrier procured a physician and surgeon
to examine claimant.
HELD:
1. Evidence examined and found not to contain a
waiver of statute.
2. There is no showing of a payment of compensation to remove
the bar of the statute. Where during the six months' period, the
carrier merely has an examination made of the claimant by a physician,
who does not treat the claimant, such is not a furnishing of medical
services in the sense that it constitutes payment of compensation which
removed the bar of the statute. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LACHES-Industrial Commission et al.
vs. Carpenter-No. 14258-Decided January 24, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:

Claimant, patrolman

on Denver Police Department,

was injured while attempting to make an arrest April 25, 1927.

He

suffered total disability for next 18 days for which he was paid full

salary. He resumed his work and retired March 16, 1937. Neither
the police department nor the claimant reported the injury to the in-'
surance carrier or to the commission. After he retired (ten years after
the injury), he filed his claim.
1. The defense of laches is not available under these
HELD:
facts for the proceedings are purely statutory and not equivalent to a
suit in equity.
2. The matter is remanded to the District Court with directions
to instruct the Industrial Commission to vacate its order, and to take
additional testimony and make proper findings and to determine
whether or not the injury was due to accident which arose out of and
in the course of claimant's employment, and whether or not the salary
was paid as compensation for the injury. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
MONEY LENDERS-STATUTES-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-PENALTIES

14241-Deet al. vs. Disque et al-No.
cided February 7, 1938-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Action to recover three times amount alleged to have
been paid upon a loan in excess of that permitted by 1913 Money
Plaintiff alleged the parties
Lenders Act (Chap. 108, S. L. 1913).
had certain loan transactions commencing in July, 1929, with several
renewals of the indebtedness, and state that all payments made after
-BOUNTIES-Siebers
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March 10th, 1936, were for excess interest over and above the amount
allowed to be received by the defendants under the statute. This
statute was specifically repealed by the 1935 Legislature which passed
an act containing a section providing that the repeal of the previous
statute shall not have the effect of releasing or changing any penalty,
forfeiture or liability, "which shall have been incurred," etc.
HELD: 1. Plaintiffs lost their right to recover treble damages
with the repeal of the 1913 act. The excess interest, here, was not
paid until after the repeal of the act.
2. Plaintiffs may recover the amount of their excess payments,
but not the penalty.
3.
A law providing a penalty in the form of a bounty to the
wronged person is not a contract such as to prohibit the State from
repealing such law; it is a contract only to the extent that it bestows
the promised bounty upon those who earn it, so long as the law remains unrepealed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Young concur.
EQUITY

PRESUMPTIONS - CONTRACTS-RAILROADS-SENIORITY
COMMITTEES-"MAIN LINE"
RIGHTS-FRAUD-GRIEVANCE
OR "BRANCH LINE"-UNIONS-Capra vs. Local Lodge No. 273,

of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers-No.
14118-Decided February 21, 1938-District Court of Denver
-Hon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:

Suit of equitable nature brought by Capra, a locomo-

tive fireman in the service of the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, to enforce what he claims to be certain seniority rights
of himself and fellow members of the defendant in error lodge, over
and upon a line of the aforementioned railroad operating between Denvr and Bond, Colorado.
On becoming a member of the lodge, Capra agreed to be governed

by the constitution and by-laws of the brotherhood, which authorizes
committees of its membership to negotiate for and establish rights in
service, and tribunals to determine questions affecting such rights as
may arise.
On April 1, 1925, a committee from five of the local lodges
located on the railroad's western line entered into a contract with the
railroad company here involved fixing certain seniority districts, and
certain territory of the railroad system was definitely allocated in the
contract. In 1927, the Moffat Tunnel was completed, and the railroad company by leasing certain other lines leading to and through the
tunnel, and by construction of 38 miles of new road, established a new
line between Denver and Grand Junction. This new line lessened
traffic on the old, reducing the working conditions of the firemen.
Members of Denver Lodge No. 273 contended as Capra now contends
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for them, and himself, that they were entitled to exclusive seniority
rights on this new line because it was a "branch" of the old line, and
not a "main line," and would come under the provisions of the 1925
contract.
The general grievance committee composed of one member from
each local, heard the matter, and by its decision held that Denver Lodge
No. 273 was not entitled to'exclusive rights over the new route and
allocated the work by percentage on a pro rata mileage basis between
lodges located on the line.
HELD: 1. The presumption is that correct and fair action was
taken by supervising authorities and tribunals, and in the absence of
fraud or caprice, courts cannot interfere.
2. As to whether the new line is a "branch" or "main line," is
a question of fact which was decided by the trial Judge as being a
"main line" and which decision the Supreme Court upholds.
3. Locomotive firemen have no inherent right to seniority in
service, and can have only such rights as may be based on a contract
relative thereto. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.

CRIMINAL

LAW-INFORMATION-ASSAULT

AND

BATTERY-PEN-

ALTY-Lane vs. The People of the State of Colorado-No. 14224

-Decided February 21, 1938-DistrictCourt of Jefferson County
-Hon. Samuel H. Johnson, Judge-Reversed and Remanded.
FACTS:
Lane was found guilty of assault and battery, and on
the Verdict, the Court sentenced him to a term of six months in jail.
Of the many errors assigned, defendant relies mainly upon the
refusal of the Court to sustain his combined motions to set aside the
verdict, one of the grounds thereof being in substance that he was
served by the District Attorney at the time of arraignment with a copy
of information materially different from the one on file with the Court,
and upon which practically the entire trial had proceeded before the
difference was discovered by him. The defendant's copy charged him
with aggravated assault but not with battery, and the information on
file, under which defendant was convicted, charges both aggravated
assault and battery. The Court withdrew the charge of assault with
a deadly weapon from the consideration of the jury and instructed the
jury that under the information, it could consider the charge of assault and battery. Defendant had waived reading of the information.
HELD:
1. An information charging assault with intent to do

bodily harm does not include a battery if such is not charged, but does
include a simple assault, as such is necessarily a part of the aggravated
assault. Therefore, under the copy of the information alleged to have
been furnished defendant, defendant could not have been convicted,
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under the circumstances of a higher degree of crime than that of simple
assault.
2. The penalty for a crime is discretionary with the Trial Court
within the statutory limitations.
3. Under the Statute the defendant shall, previous to arraignment, be furnished with a copy of the information if he or his counsel
make a request therefor. Such a request was not made by defendant,
but he cannot be penalized for such failure when he claims that he was
furnishd with a copy by the District Attorney. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Young concur in the
conclusion.
Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.

QUIET TITLE-ASSESSMENT-DESCRIPTION OF "OWNER"-INTEREST, OMISSONS-NOTICE-Olson et al vs. The Tax Service Cor-

poratiory--No. 14200-Decided February 21, 1938-District
Court of Weld County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Defendant in error brought action to quiet title to two
tracts of land, one containing ten acres and the other fifty. Ownership
was founded on two treasurer's deeds issued after the statutory time had
elapsed following the sale for the 1929 and 1930 taxes, respectively.
Plaintiff in error, Ernest W. Olson, was the owner of a life estate,
while plaintiffs in error, Floyd H. Olson, Oscar W. Olson, and Clarence R. Olson, were remaindermen.
HELD:
1. Where property is assessed in deceased owner's name,
and where the name and address of the life tenant in said estate is
known, the "owner" is sufficiently described and properly assessed.
2. Certificates of purchase are not void where rates of interest
are left blank, if there were no bids at the sale for a less rate of interest
than the statutory rate.
3. Where the certificate covers forty-seven acres and the deed attempts to convey fifty acres-three acres having been dedicated for a
public road-it can be corrected should the occasion arise, and does not
amount to a discrepancy which would void the deed.
4. The treasurer did all the law required of him, and more in
regard to giving due notice. While public officials must do their duty
and comply with the law, the impossible should not be asked of them,

nor their offices be made missing heir bureaus. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in
the conclusion.

DICTA
ComWORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY-HERNIA-Industrial
mission, et at. v. Valdez-No. 14234-Decided December 13,
1937-DistrictCourt of Huerfano County, Hon. John L. East,
Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Claimant afflicted with hernia which he contended was
the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Commission found against him. District Court reversed commission.
HELD: 1. Evidence considered and found to reasonably sustain
finding of commission that the injury did not arise out of accident in the
course of employment.
"Inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence in
2.
workmen's compensation cases are for the commission and not for the
courts."
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke, and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
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